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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARJUHJ C J. DURAND, 
Plaintiff-Appellant,, 
vs. 
CEDAR CITY CORPORATION, 
H. L. BRADLEY, ARTHUR O. 
STEWART and GRANT HINCHCLIFF, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 19033 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover damages for plaintiff's per-
sonal injuries occurring when a subject of an arrest fired a 
rifle at the defendant police officers and a bullet entered 
the plaintiff's nearby trailer home. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and entered summary judgment in favor of defendants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek affirmance of the summary judgment of the 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff has failed to comply with C<)Urt's ,,, 
October 3, l'JB3 in that her Statement of Facts cuntair, 0 
citations to tl1e record on appeal and thereby fails tn cr-
form with Rule 75(p), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Ran,: 
than controverting each of the numerous facts alleged in 
plaintiff's Statement of Facts that are totally unsupporte; 
by the record, defendants submit the following Statement oi 
Facts, which is fully supported by the record. 
On February 21, 1979, shortly after midnight, defendants 
H. L. Bradley (hereinafter "Bradley"), Arthur O. Stewart 
(hereinafter "Stewart") and Grant Hinchcliff (hereinafter 
"Hinchcliff"), three officers of the Police Department of 
defendant Cedar City Corporation, were involved in a 
with Mr. Neil Anderson (hereinafter "Neil") at Kelly's 
Trailer Park in Cedar City, Utah. The gunfight resulted ir, 
the death of Plaintiff, another resident of Kelly's 
Trailer Park, received a gunshot wound in her right foot, 
resulting in the injuries of which she complains. 
Deposition of Marjorie Jane Durand at 35-37). 
( R. 54, 
Earlier, on the evening of February 20, 1979, Neil was a 
passenger in a vehicle being driven by Eugene Anderson (here· 
inafter "Eugene"), his brother. At approximately 11:20 tha•. 
evening, Hinchcliff and officer Bruce Marshall, also oft!·" 
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L,r r·1 ty Police Department, stopped the vehicle Eugene was 
,, because they suspected that he was operating the 
re under the influence of alcohol. Upon approaching the 
,,,,1f-Is0n vehicle, it was apparent to the officers that both 
wer? intoxicated. Eugene was arrested for driving under the 
influence of alcohol and both Andersons were taken to the 
Iron County jail. (R. 21, 1111 2-3). After breathalyzer tests 
were performed at the jail, Hinchcliff contacted Neil's wife, 
Sharlene Anderson (hereinafter "Sharlene"), and requested 
that she come to the jail and transport Neil to the Anderson 
home (the car was impounded as neither Eugene nor Neil were 
fit to drive). When Sharlene arrived, she protested taking 
her husband home because in her opinion he could be argumen-
tative and make trouble when intoxicated. Nevertheless, 
because Neil was controllable and cooperative, he was 
released to his wife's custody and was taken home. 
'1'1 4-5; R. 29, 1111 2-4). 
(R. 21, 
When Neil arrived at home, he began making threats about 
getting his gun and returning to the jail to obtain his 
brother's release by force. Sharlene, alarmed by her hus-
tand's conduct, telephoned the Cedar City Police Department 
offices and notified the person answering that her husband 
wes being very abusive and threatening force with his gun. 
-. R. ) I '1 6; R. 22, '1 2; R. 23, '1 2; R. 29, 11 4). 
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Bradley, Stewart and Hinchcliff responded tc, SharlP 1,,. 
call and traveled to the trailer park in two separate F , 1 
cars. When they arrived at the Anderson trailer, Bradley 
observed Neil inside with a rifle in his hand. Sharlene 
believes that Bradley could have disarmed Neil in the 
trailer. (R. 29, 1l 4). However, Bradley states that when,, 
approached the trailer, Neil had the rifle in his hands anc 
there was no opportunity to disarm him. (R. 22, 1!1! 5-6). ;. 
is undisputed that at some time all the officers retreated 
and Neil stepped onto the porch with the rifle. Despite the 
efforts of the three officers, and Sharlene, to assure Neil 
that Eugene was being released from jail, Neil would not put 
the gun down. (R. 21, 111! 7, 9-11; R. 22, 1!1! 3-5, 7-8; R. 2J, 
H 3-5, 7-8; R. 29, 1l 4). 
Plaintiff's trailer was located across the street west c' 
the Anderson trailer and was situated such that the south 
half of it was in a direct line with the porch where Neil wa: 
standing. Stewart took a position in a small grassy area 
slightly northwest of the porch where Neil was standing and 
due east of plaintiff's trailer. Hinchcliff took cover in 
the street behind a pickup truck northwest of the Anderson 
trailer and Bradley took cover behind the northwest corner:. 
the Anderson trailer. (R. 21, 1!1! 8-10, 12 & attached dia-
gram; R. 22, 1!1! 3, 5, 7; R. 23, 1!1! 3-5, 1, 10). 
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w1. i le pointing the rifle in Stewart's direction, Neil 
1 lloe rifle and Stewart heard the bullet pass him to the 
UJl•I, heading directly toward plaintiff's trailer. All 
three officers returned fire, striking Neil, who collapsed, 
firing one more round that struck a Chevrolet parked in the 
Anderson driveway. Stewart and the other officers were at 
all times standing with their backs to plaintiff's trailer 
during the exchange of gunfire. (R. 21, 'IT'il 12-15, 17; R. 22, 
'IT'il 10-12, 14; R. 23, 'IT'il 10-12, 15). Indeed, plaintiff admits 
in her deposition that the bullet that entered her trailer 
and hit her came from the direction of the Anderson trailer. 
(R. 54, Deposition of Marjorie Jane Durand at 41-44 & Exhibit 
1). There is no evidence that the bullet that injured plain-
tiff was fired by anyone other than Neil. 
ARGUMENT 
Although it is unclear from a reading of plaintiff's 
brief, she apparently maintains that there are three genuine 
issues of material fact: 
1. Whether defendants were negligent in allowing Neil 
to leave the jail in a drunken condition with full knowledge 
of his dangerous nature and propensity for violence; 
-5-
2. Whether defendants were neglic1er.t !II failing tc. 
respond to Sharlene's call in a professional manr.er ly 
ing to disarm Neil and confronting l11m, resulting in 
exchange of gunfire; and 
3. Whether defendants' acts should be legally pro-
tected.1 
The third issue is clearly a question of law answered" 
the affirmative by the lower court. It is, of course, one c· 
the ultimate legal issues to be decided by this court. 
Neither the affidavit of Sharlene Rowley nor the deposi-
tion of plaintiff, the only evidence presented to counter 
defendants' affidavits, 2 raise any genuine issue as to 
whether defendants were negligent. Indeed, even when the 
l Plaintiff has apparently abandoned her previous 
claim that defendants were negligent in scattering gunfire 
the trailer park. 
2 Plaintiff submitted the affidavits of Patrick H. 
Fenton and Jay Jenson at the time of the original hearing m 
the Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 28, 30). The affidavit 
of Patrick H. Fenton merely contained the opinions, interpe· 
tations and conclusions of counsel regarding the affidavits 
of Hinchcliff, Bradley and Stewart, a function that is the 
province of the court. The affidavit of Jay Jenson expresse: 
an opinion concerning the bullet that entered plaintiff's 
trailer, which opinion was wholly without foundation. 
affidavits would be inadmissible as evidence. Therefore, 
both affidavits were properly stricken by the lower court 
pursuant to Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Walker v. Rock Mountain Recreation Cor ., 29 Utah 2d 274, 
508 P.2d 538, 542 1973 • See also Go Real Estate Co. v. 
Smyth, No. 19057 (Utah November---:r;-1983). 
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a1P viewed entirely in plaintiff's favor and even if 
' , ',ts were shown to be negligent in some respect, such 
1 0 r1c arP immaterial because defendants had no special duty 
to prutect plaintiff and her claims are barred by the provi-
sions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT NEGLIGENT, AS A MATTER 
OF LAW 
The affidavits submitted by both parties, and any other 
facts presently in the record, establish that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendants 
were negligent. 
In general, this court has defined negligence as "the 
failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would have 
done under the circumstances, or doing what such person under 
such circumstances would not have done." Meese v. Brigham 
Young University, 639 P.2d 720, 723 (Utah 1981). Accord, 
Evans v. Stuart, 17 Utah 2d 308, 410 P.2d 999, 1001 (1966). 
An application of the definition of negligence to the 
circumstances indicates that there is no issue as to whether 
defendants were negligent; they clearly were not. While 
plaintiff claims that defendants negligently released Neil, 
it is clear they had no legal basis to hold him. Neil could 
'"" ue held for drunken driving since he was not driving, nor 
could defendants legally have held Neil simply because 
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Sharlene was concerned about what do, especial]/ 
since Neil was cooperative and rational when leavin<J tltc 
jail. Having no realistic basis to detain Nei 1. defenrliud 
had no choice but to release him. Thus, under the circum-
stances of the situation, defendants could not be negligee• 
for releasing Anderson. 
Plaintiff then claims that defendants were negligent in 
failing to disarm Neil and choosing instead to confront hir 
in the gunfight. Assuming that Bradley or any of the other 
defendants had an opportunity to disarm Neil in the trailer, 
as suggested by the affidavit of Sharlene Rowley, there is r.'. 
evidence that their failure to do so constituted negligence. 
Sharlene offers the unsupported opinion that Bradley could 
have disarmed Neil, yet offers no explanation as to how it 
could have been accomplished. It is clear that she is 
attempting to second-guess Bradley's decision. Bradley 
no knowledge of the conditions in the trailer. Under the 
circumstances, it would have been unreasonable for Bradley:· 
the other defendants to risk their lives and the lives of 
others, perhaps children, to attempt to disarm Neil and coo-
front him in the confined trailer. Surely, defendants cannc: 
be negligent in failing, by some undisclosed method, to dis· 
arm Anderson under the circumstances at the time. 
-8-
r ", t her more, what choice did defendants have once Neil 
t'' the porch with a rifle pointed at them? No reason-
1 1. I•·· f'E'rSOll would expect them to request Neil to go to a 
sev)uded field to wield his gun and shoot at defendants. 
undPr the circumstances, defendants had no choice but to con-
front Anderson in the trailer park. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANTS OWED PLAINTIFF NO INDIVIDUAL 
DUTY TO PROTECT HER FROM HARM 
Even assuming that defendants were negligent in some 
respect, such negligence is not material because without the 
breach of legally recognized duty, there can be no recovery. 
"Negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do." 
F. Pollock, Law of Torts 468 (13th ed. 1929). 
Defendants do not deny that the police have a general 
duty to protect the health, lives and morals of the public. 
However, a city or its police have no duty to an individual 
for injuries directly resulting from the criminal acts of a 
third person, even if the city or its police somehow breached 
the general duty to protect the safety of the public. In 
Obray v. Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160 (1971), plain-
tiff filed suit against the Cache County Sheriff and his 
deputy aamages and the officers' removal from office 
tur Lheir alleged willful and wanton failure to investigate a 
burglary of the plaintiff's store. Upon defendants' motion, 
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the lower court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, this 
court affirmed the dismissal. Citing Massengill v. Yuma 
County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969), this court w1 , L, 
[W]e believe that defendants' contention that fail-
ure by a public sheriff to investigate a crime 
claimed by an individual to have been committed, 
ordinarily is a matter of judgment and discretion, 
not actionable or compensable, and not pursuable by 
an individual since the public official's duty is to 
the public, - he being accountable to and removable 
in a proper proceeding, by the public. 
Obray v. Malmberg, 26 Utah 17, 484 P.2d 160, 162 (footnotes 
omitted). 
In Massengill, a deputy sheriff failed to apprehend and 
arrest two speeding, intoxicated drivers before they were 
involved in an accident resulting in the death of plaintiffs' 
decedent. The trial court dismissed the action by plaintiffs 
against the County and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, 
holding that the defendant owed no duty to the deceased as an 
individual. Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 
P.2d 376, 381 (1969). The Arizona court further stated that 
the duty imposed upon a police officer was a duty to the pub-
lie in general and not to any particular person. Accord-
ingly, the failure to adequately discharge a police officer' 
function would result in a public rather than a private 
injury, with recourse being had, if at all, through public 
prosecution rather than through a civil action for damages 
Id., 456 P.2d at 379. 
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i\r1<•ther case supporting the Obray rule is Keane v. City 
98 Ill. App. 2d 460, 240 N.E.2d 321 (1968) • 
. e, the trial court dismissed an action brought by the 
husband of a school teacher for failing to provide police 
prutection to the teacher, who was attacked and killed by a 
student while on school premises. The Illinois Court of 
Appeals affirmed, holding that the duty of the city to pro-
tect the plaintiff's decedent from criminal acts was no 
greater than its "general duty to all citizens to protect the 
safety and well-being of the public at large." Id. at 322. 
The court also provided the following public policy support 
tor its holding that there should be no recovery for breach 
of a general public duty: 
To hold that under the circumstances alleged in the 
complaint the city owed a "special duty" to Mrs. 
Keane for the safety and well-being of her person 
would impose an all but impossible burden upon the 
City, considering the numerous police, fire, housing 
and other laws, ordinances and regulations in force. 
Id. Accord, Simpson Food Fair, Inc. v. City of Evansville, 
149 Ind. App. 387, 272 N.E.2d 871, 873-76 (1971). 
The proposition that defendants owed plaintiff no special 
duty is further illustrated in Evers v. Westerberg, 38 A.D.2d 
751, 329 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1972). There, the police allowed an 
intoxicated motorist to drive his car away from the scene of 
accident. The driver was involved in a second collision 
some 20 minutes later, killing another motorist. The lower 
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court entered judgment for plaintiff, who was administret 1 
of the estate of the deceased motorist. The New Yori; s"I" 
court, Appellate Division, modified the judgment, hcldiny 
that although the intoxicated driver defendant was liable, 
the defendant village was not liable for failing to arrest 
the intoxicated driver and allowing him to leave the scene 0 , 
the first accident. The court further stated: 
It is well settled that a municipality, acting 
in its governmental capacity for the protection of 
the general public, cannot be cast in damages for a 
mere failure to furnish adequate protection to a 
particular individual to whom it has assumed no 
special duty. The Village's alleged failure to 
enforce its regulations and the Vehicle and Traffic 
Law by arresting Westerberg for intoxication, taking 
his car keys or impounding his automobile falls 
squarely within this rule of nonliability. It owed 
no special duty to Mr. and Mrs. Evers and through 
its officers, did not take any affirmative action 
which resulted in injury to a member of the public. 
Id., 329 N.Y.S.2d at 618 (citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original). Accord, Evett v. City of Inverness, 224 So. 2d 
365, 366-67 (Fla. App. 1969). 
In the instant case, plaintiff cannot demonstrate any 
special duties owed to her by defendants, aside from their 
general duty to protect the public. Indeed, the negligence, 
ii any, of defendants in releasing Neil from police custod) 
while he was still intoxicated, or in failing to disarm him, 
is much less culpable than that of the police in Evers, who 
released an intoxicated driver who they did have a legal 
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'' to detain and who had already been involved in one 
111 the event that plaintiff's earlier additional conten-
tion that defendants were negligent in scattering gunfire 
comes before this court, there is overwhelming authority, in 
addition to the foregoing, to the effect that municipalities 
are not liable for injuries to others resulting from the ful-
fillment or breach of the general duty to apprehend wrong-
doers. See, Roll v. Timberman, 94 N.J. Super. 530, 229 
A.2d 281, 284 (1967) (police not liable for injuries to 
bystander, caused by apprehension of fleeing motorist whose 
reckless acts are the proximate cause of the injuries); Scott 
v. City of New York, 2 A.D.2d 854, 155 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788 
(innocent bystander injured by gunshot wound resulting 
from police apprehension of escaped prisoner cannot recover 
from city who owed no special duty to bystander even if the 
police were negligent in permitting the escape), 9 
N.Y.2d 764, 215 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1961). 
Based upon Obray and the ample authority from other 
jurisdictions, it is evident that even if defendants were 
somehow negligent by releasing the intoxicated Neil, in fail-
ing to disarm him, or in confronting Neil in the gunfight and 
scattering gunfire, they cannot be liable to plaintiff 
Lecause she has not shown, and cannot show, that defendants 
breached any more than their general duty to the public. 
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Thus, although plaintiff could perhaps maintain a cause of 
action against Neil's estate for Neil's acts in initiatir,ci 
the confrontation with defendants, she has TJO basis fur 
recovery against defendants. 
POINT II I 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE PROVI-
SIONS OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
A. Plaintiff's Claims are Barred LY Governmental Immun-
Aside from the fact that defendants cannot be liable to 
plaintiff for any negligent breach of their general duty to 
the public, they are immune from suit under the provisions of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, which provides: "Except 
as may be otherwise provided in this Act, all governmental 
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results 
from the exercise of a governmental function Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (Supp. 1983). 
There is no dispute that defendants were involved in a 
governmental function under the test established in 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., GOS P.2d 1230 (Utah 
1980). There, this court stated the following general rule 
for determining whether an activity is a governmental func-
tion: "[T]he test for determining governmental immunity is 
whether the activity under consideration is of such a unique 
nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agen 
-14-
or that it is essential to the core of governmental activ-
Id. at 1236-37. 
11 .. th1ng could be more essential to the core of governmen-
ta! ciCtivity than the enforcement of the laws and maintenance 
of peace and order performed by a city police department and 
its officers. Consequently, other provisions of the Utah 
covernmental Immunity Act apply. The applicable section of 
the act provides: 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for injury proximately caused by negligent 
act or omission of an employee committed within the 
scope of his employment except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or perfor-
mance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the dis-
cretion is abused . 
Id., § 63-30-lO(l)(a) (emphasis added). 
AssumJng defendants had a choice regarding whether to 
release Neil or whether to disarm or confront him, those 
choices were discretionary functions within the meaning of 
Section 63-30-lO(l)(a). Although plaintiff argues that these 
decisions were a matter of "duty", not discretion, she cites 
no legal authority in support of that contention. 
This court has applied Section 63-30-lO(l)(a) to a fact 
situation analogous to the one at bar. In Epting v. State, 
54f P.2d 242 (Utah 1976), the minor children of a murder 
victim sued the State of Utah on the theory that its 
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employees were negligent in allowing a state prison 
go on a work release program from which the prisonPr ]ef; 
murdered plaintiffs' mother. The trial court 11., 
complaint and this court affirmed, holding that the 
officials were involved in the exercise of a discretionary 
function when they placed the prisoner on work release and 
thus were immune from suit under Section 63-30-lO(l)(a). 
court further stated that it was discretionary with prison 
officials as to whether it would be valuable and practicable 
to place a particular prisoner on the work release program, 
Id. at 243-44. See also Amato v. United States, 549 F. SuPf. 
863, 866 (D.N.J. 1982) (decision not to arrest person prior 
to his commission of bank robbery that it was known by police 
officers would be committed was a discretionary function 
under the virtually identical discretionary function exemp-
tion of the Federal Tort Claims Act). In the instant case, 
the decision of whether to release Neil, assuming there was 
some legal ground to hold him the first place, was also dis-
cretionary and defendants are immune from suit pursuant to 
Section 63-30-lO(l)(a). 
At best, the only possible legal basis that defendants 
had for arresting and holding Neil (a basis that is only ter.-
uously supported by the record) was for the offense of intox-
ication. Utah Code Ann.§ 76-9-701 (Supp. 1983). However, 
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,,,,, 76-9-701 further provides that a peace officer may at 
i•scretion release an individual arrested for intoxica-
ll'"' if he believes imprisonment would be unnecessary. Id. 
\ 76-9-701 ( 2). Thus, even if defendants could have held Neil 
for intoxication, the very statute giving them the right to 
hold Neil provides that the decision to release him was the 
exercise of a discretionary function. 
According to the Florida Supreme Court, the decision not 
to disarm Neil and to otherwise confront him was also discre-
tionary. In Wong v. City of Miami, 237 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 
1970), plaintiffs alleged that a decision not to confront 
political demonstrators constituted negligence and had proxi-
mately caused property damage that resulted when the demon-
stration got out of control. The lower court dismissed the 
complaint and both the Florida Court of Appeals and the 
Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the decision of 
whether to confront the demonstrators was discretionary, and 
that the decisionmakers were not subject to liability. The 
court stated further: 
While sovereign immunity is a salient issue 
here, we ought not lose sight of the fact that 
inherent in the right to exercise police powers is 
the right to determine strategy and tactics for the 
deployment of those powers • The sovereign 
authorities ought to be left free to exercise their 
discretion and choose the tactics deemed appropriate 
without worry over possible allegations of negli-
gerice. 
-17-
Id. at 134. 
The rule of Wong is applicable in the instant case 
decision of whether to release Neil and the rlecision of 
whether to attempt to disarm him or confront him were deci-
sions involving judgment, tactics and strategy. The defen-
dants were confronted with a dangerous and difficult situa-
tion which they handled as well as they could, and according 
to their own best judgment. Their actions should not be 
judicially second-guessed since they clearly involve matter 5 
of discretion. Therefore, pursuant to Section 
63-30-lO(l)(a), defendants are immune from suit and plain-
tiff's action against them should be barred. 
B. Plaintiff's Claims are Barred by Virtue of Her Fail-
ing to Comply with Sections 63-30-11 and 63-30-19 of 
the Governmental Immunity Act. 
In addition to providing defendants immunity from suit ii 
this case, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act requires that 
plaintiff file a proper and adequate notice of claim and tha: 
she provide or file a bond or undertaking. Contrary to 
plaintiff's contention that these procedural requirements 
were raised by separate motion, defendants' original Motion 
for Summary Judgment specifically states as one of its 
grounds that plaintiff failed to comply with the above 
requirements. Thus, since the lower court's reasons for 
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1 111g the summary judgment were not stated (R. 46, 47), 
"' tff's failure to comply with these provisions could 
,,,_,I 1,ave bee!l a hasis for the grant of summary judgment. 
In Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480, 
482 (Utah 1975), this Court stated that "full compliance with 
[the Utah Governmental Immunity Act] requirements is a condi-
t1on precedent to the right to maintain a suit." Plaintiff 
has failed to properly comply with Sections 63-30-11 and 
63-30-19 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
The 1978 version of Section 63-30-11, the version most 
likely applicable here, provides: 
Any person having a claim for injury to person or 
property against a governmental entity or its 
employee shall, before maintaining an action under 
this act, file a written notice of claim with such 
entity for appropriate relief including money dam-
ages. The notice of claim shall set forth a brief 
statement of the facts and the nature of the claim 
asserted, shall be signed by the person making the 
claim or such person's agent, attorney, parent or 
legal guardian, and shall be directed and delivered 
to the responsible governmental entity within the 
time prescribed in section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13, as 
applicable. 
l_cl., § 63-30-11 (Supp. 1981). See also Yates v. Vernal -----
Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1980); 
Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480, 482 
(Utah 1975). 
Defendants admit that plaintiff filed a purported notice 
• with the Cedar City Corporation and that it was 
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filed within the prescribed time. A copy of the notice uf 
claim that was filed is attached as Exhibit "F" to p!C11r 
tiff's brief. However, that purported notice of claim Ll• 
not comply with the essentials established in Section 
63-30-11. It merely reports facts and makes legal conclu-
s ions. There is no formal demand for any kind of money dam-
ages or other relief from the city. Furthermore, the natuie 
of the claim asserted is unclear. Consequently, since the 
purported notice of claim attached to plaintiff's brief is 
improper, and plaintiff failed to file a proper and timely 
notice of claim within one year after the cause of action 
arose, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (Supp. 1983), she is barred 
from mcrintaining this action. 
Even assuming that plaintiff has filed a proper and 
timely notice of claim in compliance with Section 63-30-11, 
she has not obtained or filed a bond as required under Sec-
tion 63-30-19. Plaintiff has evidently filed a bond pursuant 
to Section 78-11-10 of the Utah Code, as required by virtue 
of her action against the three individual respondents in 
this case, but Section 63-30-19 requires an additional bond 
be filed in order for plaintiff to maintain an action against 
Cedar City Corporation. It provides: 
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff shall 
file an undertaking in a sum fixed by the court, but 
in no case less than the sum of $300, conditioned 
-20-
"ron payment by the plaintiff of taxable costs 
, , 1'ur red by the governmental entity in the action if 
11,<> plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or fails 
recover judgment. 
Ii c;I ·,,de Ann. § 63-30-19 (1978). Based upon Scarborough, 
failure to provide and file the bond required by 
section 63-30-19 precludes her from pursuing this action. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has failed to file a proper and timely notice 
of claim and has failed to obtain and file an appropriate 
bond as required by Sections 63-30-11 and 63-30-19 of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. Thus, her action is precluded at 
the outset. But, even assuming plaintiff has met these pro-
ceoural requirements, her action still fails on the merits. 
The record establishes that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact. Defendants were not negligent, as a matter of 
law, since under the circumstances, they simply had no choice 
but to act as they did. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the defendants were negligent in 
some respect, such negligence at best amounted to only a 
breach of a general duty owed to the public at large for 
which defendants cannot be held civilly liable to plaintiff. 
Finally, pursuant to Section 63-30-lO(l)(a) of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, defendants are immune from suit 
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since their alleged acts of negligence involved the pert,, 
mance of a discretionary function. Consequently, plinnt 
action is barred. 
For the above reasons, the summary judgment of the lower 
court should be affirmed. 
DATED this c2oif aay of November, 1983. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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